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ARDEN v. FREYDBERG
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Conditional Offer Implied From A Request To
Submit Proposals
Arden v. Freydberg'
Plaintiff, an independent insurance agent, was asked to
devise a plan of life insurance to meet the specific problems
of the defendants and their associates in certain corporate
enterprises. After the plan was submitted, insurance consultants were called in to review the problem and the defendants orally promised plaintiff that the insurance
would be placed through him. Thereafter, plaintiff was
told that defendants would use his exact plan but were
going to place the insurance through another agent, an
officer of defendants' firm who acquired an insurance license for the sole purpose of writing this business. Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract for an amount equal
to the commissions he would have received on the policies
had they been placed with him. He alleged that defendants, when they requested a plan, implied that insurance
would be placed through plaintiff if the plan were accepted, and he also argued that defendants were liable on
the subsequent oral promise. The trial court rendered an
amended judgment for plaintiff from which an appeal was
taken. The Appellate Division reversed on the law and
the facts,2 and the plaintiff appealed. In a 4-3 decision
sustaining the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals of
New York held that the agent did not make out a case of
an enforceable contract. The majority ruled that at the
time plaintiff was asked to submit a plan, defendants made
no promise, express or implied, to buy the insurance from
plaintiff. Although subsequent to plaintiff's submission of
the plan, assurances were given him that he would be the
recipient of the business, the Court said "[s]uch assurances, although in the nature of promises, came too late to
benefit the plaintiff. He had already performed what he
had undertaken to do. His past performance, although
rendered upon request,
afforded no consideration for the
'3
belated oral promises."
The dissenting judges stated that the case should be
remanded for a new trial. In their opinion defendants
impliedly promised to buy insurance policies through
plaintiff if he submitted an acceptable plan.
19 N.Y. 2d 393,
2201 N.Y.S. 2d

174 N.E. 2d 495 (1961).
151 (1960).
89 N.Y. 2d 393, 174 N.E. 2d 495, 497 (1961).
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Normally the compensation an insurance agent receives is commissions if and when insurance is placed with
an underwriter. He submits no bills for time spent negotiating the policy, nor does he usually charge a fee for
consultation. Thus, unless he is entitled to commissions
for acting as agent between the customer and the insurer,
he is not entitled to anything. The question is then, when
does he become entitled to commissions. Is the appropriation and use of his plan by the purchaser enough, or must
he prove more in order to sustain an action?
Most courts have taken a very strict view and have
said that he is not entitled to commissions unless the contract expressly designates him as agent.' One court has
said, "[t]he law is clear, an insurance purchaser may employ a new broker at any time."5 (Emphasis supplied.)
This rule has worked hardship in several cases. For instance, an insurance company permitted the customer to
designate a different agent just at the time of signing the
insurance contract. The first agent had literally done all
the negotiating and the work preparatory to the sale of
the policy, but his right to compensation for that work
was effectively cut off by the last minute change of name.8
There, as in the Arden case, the plaintiff's plan was appropriated but that fact was insufficient to sustain a cause of
action in contract.
There is, however, a valid argument that an agent
should be entitled to commissions when he has his plan
appropriated. 7 This argument is based on the theory of
implied contracts. The process of implication is one of
interpreting the promisor's words and conduct in view
of the surrounding circumstance which involves the mak'E.g., Erlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 217 Cal. 374, 18 P. 2d 660
(1933); Cronin v. National Shawrout -Bank, 306 Mass. 202, 27 N.E. 2d
717 (1940); Clineby v. Grandview Dairy, 283 N.Y. 39, 27 N.E. 2d 425
(1940). There seems to be no Maryland Court of Appeals cases on the
issue
of when an insurance agent is entitled to commissions.
5
Hanley v. Marsh & McLennan - J. B. F. Davis & Son, 46 Cal. App. 2d
787,
117 -P. 2d 69, 73 (1941).
6
Clinchy v. Grandview Dairy, supra, n. 4.
In Gunderson v. North American Life & Casualty Co., 248 Minn. 114,
78 N.W. 2d 328 (1956), an insurance agent negotiated an insurance contract which, on request of the customer, was then placed through
another established agent of the same insurance company. Plaintiff recovered the commissions for the sale in a suit against the insurance
company on the theory that he had consummated the sale. This decision
applies a concept familiar in real estate brokerage law, but it is a lone
decision in the field of insurance. See Anno. 88 A.L.R. 716 (1934). No
space has been devoted to the discussion of the merits of this decision
because this note examines primarily the transaction between the agent
and the purchaser rather than that between the agent and the insurance
company.
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ing of logical and factual inferences. The aim of the
process is to determine the promissor's intention, i.e.,
whether he intended a promise but did not express it in
promissory words.8 Thus, when an action is taken by one
who intended to charge, at the request of one who intended
to pay, there is by implication a unilateral contract in
its simplest form. The request for service is the sole
assertion of the intention to pay, and as such, it is the
single factor from which a promise to pay is implied. For
example, A requests B, a professional gardener, to mow
his lawn. B mows the lawn and when A refuses to pay,
B has an action for breach of a contract. Nothing was
expressly said about a promise to pay, but any reasonable
man would find such an intention expressed in A's conduct. This type of transaction is a common occurrence, and
the legal result is a clear one.
Equally common in today's business world is the request by a prospective customer for the services of an
insurance agent, an interior decorator or an architect. The
initial request is for them to furnish plans and estimates
of cost. Whether this request shows an intention to pay
is not as clear as in the lawn mowing case. There probably
is no intention to pay for merely the submission of the
plans. Nor is there an intention to be bound to take any
plan at all. Perhaps the request is an offer that if any
plan is suitable its writer shall be employed to oversee
construction of the project in the case of an architect; to
decorate the office in the case of an interior decorator; or,
in insurance, to secure an underwriter for the plan. Thus,
it may be argued that a promise to employ the agent conditioned upon the plan being satisfactory and acceptable to
the customer may be implied from the request for proposals.' Interpreting the request in this way would not
seem foreign to the intentions of potential customers.
Their motive is to get good ideas from the salesmen,
and offering employment as a reward for the best idea is
the incentive to this end. Actual acceptance of the plan
amounts to an assertion by the customer that the plan
satisfied the condition of the offer. Thus, when a prospective customer uses the plan but does not compensate the
writer of it, the agent should be allowed to sustain a suit for
breach of contract and recover in damages an amount equal
to the commission.
CORBIN, CONTRAarS (1960), Ch. 25, p. 276.
See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY 2d § 441, p. 1027, Comment (a) for illustrations of conditional offers in situations similar to the insurance one.
83
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In Massachusetts and in California, however, the courts
have not interpreted the request for submission of proposals as a conditional offer. They hold that a request for
proposals is a mere request for offers and not an offer
itself. °
Perhaps courts which have considered the problem
have refused to raise an implied agreement for reasons
apart from strict contract interpretation.
One good reason may be that this sort of implied
promise has never been effectively argued. In Cronin v.
National Shawmut Bank," the plaintiff-agent argued that
defendant impliedly promised "that if the proposal submitted . . .should be the lowest or most advantageous to
the defendant, it would be accepted. .".
."' In the instant
case, plaintiff argued that defendants impliedly promised
to buy insurance policies through plaintiff if he would devise a coroporate life insurance plan for them and other
stockholders that would solve the corporate and the defendants' problem. A similar promise was argued in
13
Hanley v. Marsh & McLennan - J. B. F. Davis & Son.
These promises are conditional, but the condition to be
satisfied as a precedent to a contract is an event over
which the customer has no control. The prospective customer does not make an offer to be bound on the happening
of such a condition. He intends to reserve the right to be
influenced by matters other than mere rates and terms.
The advantage of the solution offered herein is that the
customer controls the happening of the condition. He reserves the absolute right to be satisfied. However, once
he unequivocally manifests his satisfaction by accepting a
plan, he should not be allowed to say he did not intend to
incur an obligation to pay for it.
Another reason why courts may have been reluctant to
imply the type of promise urged herein is for reasons of
I0See Erlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 217 Cal. 374, 18 P. 2d, 660
(1933) and Cronin v. National Shawmut Bank, 306 Mass. 202, 27 N.E.
2d 717, 721 (1940). In the latter case, the Court distinguished the real
estate situation from that of insurance. The Court said:
"There is nothing in the evidence to show the existence of a business
custom or usage that the insured should pay an insurance broker's
commission similar to the general practice out of which the legal
implication of an offer by the real estate owner to the real estate
broker originally sprang."
See Heslop v. Dieudonne, 209 Md. 201, 120 A. 2d 669 (1956) for conditional offer in thereal estate law in Maryland. See also 1 Mn. CODE (1957)
Art. 2, § 17.
Supra, n. 4.
1'306 Mass. 202, 27 N.E. 2d 717, 720 (1940).
'246 Cal. App. 2d 787, 117 P. 2d 69, 73 (1941).
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public policy. For instance, the court in the Arden case
said:
"To hold that circumstances such as here described
give rise to an enforcible contract for payment of commissions on policies of insurance to be written would
14
open the door to an entirely new field of liability."'
There seems to be the further feeling in the decisions
that if courts make implied agreements for parties where
there is some doubt as to what the parties intended, there
will be an interference with the freedom of contract.
Courts have said that purchasers should be free to change
agents whenever they want. 15 In New York this policy has
been embodied to a limited extent in a statute requiring
that certain types of insurance brokers' claims for compensation be based on written memoranda. 16
It is, however, submitted that in making an effort to
preserve the freedom of contract and the right of prospective customers to deal with whom they desire, the courts
have permitted them to abuse their privileges. The decisions have resulted in a judicially enforced Statute of
Frauds. Under the present decisions, an insurance agent,
in order to be protected, must, before submitting any
proposals, exact from the prospective customer a promise that he will be employed if a proposal is used. While
some salesmen have sometimes succeeded in obtaining
similar promises,'1 7 it is believed that most prospective
customers would be unwilling to so commit themselves.
Other remedies an agent may have are difficult to prove,
and recovery is inadequate. 8 Hence the proposition that
'9 N.Y. 2d, 393, 174 N.E. 2d 495, 496 (1961).
Supra, ns. 4 and 5.
16 "No insurance broker shall have any right to compensation other than
commissions deductible from premiums on insurance policies or contracts,
from any insured or prospective insured for or on account of the negotiation or procurement of, or other services in connection with, any contract
of insurance made or negotiated in this state, unless such right to compensation is based upon a written memorandum, signed by the party to be
charged, and specifying or clearly defining the amount or extent of such
compensation." 27 MoKi NEY's NEw YORK CoasoL. LAws (1949) § 129.
Maryland has no corresponding statutory provision.
17For similar situations where the plaintiff has been an unsolicited
salesman see Masline v. New York, N.H. & H.R. CO., 95 Conn. 702, 112
A. 639 (1921) ; Singer v. Karron, 162 Misc. 809, 294 N.Y.S. 566 (1937).
Is A quasi-contractual recovery is not satisfactory because of the speculative nature of damages. See discussion in Cronin v. National Shawmut
Bank, 306 Mass. 202, 27 N.E. 2d 717, 722 (1940). The measure of damages
in such a case is the amount of unjust enrichment. It is interesting to
note that defendants offered to pay plaintiff in the Arden case a relatively small sum for his ideas. Arden refused to take it. Agents can try
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an implied agreement, based on acceptance of the agent's
plan, is necessary to afford him some semblance of adequate protection. This is not to suggest that an agent
should have a cause of action for every useful bit of information he reveals and which is later used by customers. He, of course, must bear the normal risks of not
being able to make a sale. But if a prospective customer
abuses the agent's services by appropriating a valuable
proposal (as in the instant case), an agreement should be
implied. If the courts continue not to recognize such a
promise as a matter of policy, then should not the legislature enact a statute similar to that in the real estate area 9
to at least clarify the agent's rights.
MONA SALYER LvxmD

Enforceability Of Temporary Binders Issued By
Life Insurance Companies
Simpson v. PrudentialInsurance Co. of America'
At the solicitation of an agent of defendant insurance
company, plaintiff and her husband decided to take out a
policy on his life. The husband executed the non-medical
part of the application, and upon being told by the agent
that "When you give me the check for a payment on this
insurance, you are covered. When I receive your check,
you are covered as of then," he drew a check, payable to
the insurance company, for the first annual premium. The
check was cashed by the company the next day. Subsequently, the husband was given a physical examination
by a physician selected by the insurance company. The
results of the examination were satisfactory, except that
a "trace" of sugar was found in the urine. In such a case,
the application required that a sample of the urine tested
to sue for conversion of ideas in a situation such as here, but courts
have been very reluctant to recognize a property right in ideas. Even in
the jurisdictions where recovery is allowed, an agent must prove that his
idea was original, concrete and useful. An agent in the typical insurance
situation would probably be unable to meet this burden of proof. For a
discussion of the right to compensation for the unsolicited disclosure of
business ideas see NoT, Compensation For Unsolicited Disclosure of
Business Ideas, 21 Md. L. Rev. 139 (1961).
"1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 2, § 17.
1227 Md. 393, 177 A. 2d 417 (1962).

